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PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. V. MISSISSIPPI AND




The public trust doctrine, rooted in Roman law, holds that title to sub-
merged land and tidelands is held in trust by the sovereign or state for the
benefit of the people. As traditionally recognized, the trust doctrine provides
that the public may use such property for commerce, navigation, and fishing.
Since the environmental awakening of the early 1970's, however, the tradi-
tional triumvirate of uses' has expanded to embrace a wide range of per-
ceived social, environmental, and economic needs. As a result of this
expansion, courts have struggled to put the ancient public trust doctrine into
proper perspective. Along the way, courts have attempted to balance the
often competing values of private property interests and public rights. This
tension has mirrored the larger debate within public resource law between
common and private control of natural resources.2 Changing perceptions of
private and public needs have altered the scope of the public trust doctrine
and have led to a measure of uncertainty as to its proper physical
application.3
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,4 the United States Supreme Court
1. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894). See generally Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine
in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
2. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's En-
vironmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195 (1980). This tension has, perhaps, been more
clearly evident in the emerging "takings" law of the current United States Supreme Court.
See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) (the imposition of a
public access requirement in exchange for Coastal Commission approval to build constitutes a
compensable taking); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct.
2378 (1987) (requiring the payment of damages for the temporary denial of use of property);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987) (Pennsylvania sub-
surface mining regulation held not a taking); see also Large, The Supreme Court and the Tak-
ings Clause. The Search for a Better Rule, 18 ENVTL. L. 3 (1987); Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967) [hereinafter Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness];
Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1988); Sax, Takings, Private Property
and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Note, Taking a Step Back: A Reconsideration of
the Takings Test of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 102 HARV. L. REV. 448 (1988).
3. See Stevens, supra note 2, at 196.
4. 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
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clarified the basis for state reliance on the public trust doctrine and signifi-
cantly expanded the doctrine's geographical reach. The Phillips court held
that upon becoming a state, Mississippi became fee simple owner of all lands
under tidally influenced water.5 The extent to which the state could prop-
erly claim title was based on the rights and privileges of the original states,
which were granted in like fashion to newly admitted states under the equal
footing doctrine.6
Significantly, the Court rejected the navigability-in-fact standard as the
sine qua non 7 of lands subject to the public trust.' Instead, the Court read
English common law,9 early state law from the original thirteen states, 10 and
its own precedents11 for the proposition that all lands subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide, whether navigable in fact or not, are subject to the state's
public trust interest."
Phillips arose out of a dispute over legal title to forty-two acres of land
underlying several small streams and a bayou in southwestern Mississippi." a
The waters over the property were neither navigable nor were they immedi-
ately adjacent to the sea. 14 They were, nonetheless, affected by the ebb and
flow of the tide through a tributary flowing into the Gulf of Mexico.1 5 Cin-
que Bambini Partnership and Phillips Petroleum Company brought suit 16 to
quiet title to this mineral-rich property as record title holders, claiming a
chain of title dating back to pre-statehood Spanish land grants of 1813.17
The State of Mississippi, however, asserted title in fee simple as public
trustee under the public trust doctrine." The Supreme Court of Mississippi
held that the state owned the subject properties in fee simple.' 9 As a result,
5. Id. at 795.
6. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 53-73.
7. Brief for Petitioners at 31, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988)
(No. 86-870) [hereinafter Petitioners' Brief].
8: Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 797.
9. Id. at 796. Although the Court specifically reserved ruling on the state of the English
law regarding the type of lands in question, the Court did accept its earlier pronouncements as
binding. Id. (relying on Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894)).
10. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 794-95.
11. Id. at 794-97; see infra notes 74-122.
12. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 795.
13. Id. at 793.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986), aff'd sub nom.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
17. Id. at 511.
18. Id. at 510.
19. Id. at 510-11.
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the state was free to issue oil and gas leases to private parties for the proper-
ties at issue despite Cinque Bambini's record title.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed.2" The Court held that tidal
influence, and not navigability-in-fact, was the test for identifying lands21
subject to the public trust. Justice White, writing for the majority,22 deter-
mined that at the time of the American Revolution, the thirteen original
states acquired fee simple title to all tidal land within their boundaries. Such
tidal lands were held by the states as trustees for its citizens. New states,
upon admission to the union, acquired a like trust over tidal lands within
their boundaries on an equal footing with the original thirteen states.23 As a
result of this clarification of the ebb-and-flow test, millions of acres of non-
navigable, tidal property are now squarely within the states' public trust.24
The dissent 25 argued strongly that reasonable property expectations of
landowners in Mississippi and in every coastal state would be severely dis-
rupted26 by extending the scope of the public trust doctrine beyond what it
perceived as the doctrine's historical parameters.
This Note examines the development of the public trust doctrine in Ro-
man law, English common law, and American Law. It then examines the
continued application of the doctrine in the United States with examples of
its varied interpretations by different states and in the large body of Supreme
Court case law. The Note analyzes the Phillips decision in light of its consis-
tent use of case law and as a balance between legitimate private interests and
long-recognized public rights. The Note concludes by suggesting that a
proper application of the public trust doctrine will serve as an important
economic and environmental tool for state control over tidal property.
20. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988). The Court divided five to
three. Justice Kennedy took no part in the discussion or decision of the case. At the time oral
argument on the case was heard, Kennedy had not yet been appointed to the Court.
21. Id. at 795. The waters at issue in this case were non-navigable and tidal, as opposed to
"inland" waters, which are non-tidal by definition. Id. at 793. A large body of public trust law
has developed around this latter class of waters, the test for which has traditionally been navi-
gability. For a fuller discussion of the implications of this distinction, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 186-217.
22. Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, Blackmun
and Marshall.
23. See infra notes 53-73 and accompanying text.
24. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 804 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing S. SHAW & C. FREDINE,
FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, U. S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, CIRCULAR 39, WETLANDS OF
THE UNITED STATES at 15 (1956)).
25. Justice O'Connor was joined by Justices Stevens and Scalia.
26. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
A. Res Communes: Origins of the Public Trust in Roman Law
Roman law developed out of a system in which the demands of commerce
competed against burgeoning concentrations of urban life.27 Most types of
property were classified as belonging to individuals.28 Some things,29 how-
ever, were considered by operation of a "natural law" to be the property of
no one.30 Roman law recognized that the air, the sea, and the shore were
public.3" This notion of res communes was an essential element of Roman
law upon which the foundation of the common law was built.32
B. The Common Law Extension of the Trust and Its Application
to the Several States
As the Roman Empire declined, European commerce also declined.33
The public trust reached its nadir at this point in the Dark Ages as control of
public waterways began to slip away from the public and into private
hands. 34 The English king's sovereign control over public waters came to be
viewed as a personal fee. 35 As a result, the king freely privatized formerly
common property at the expense of the public's long-recognized claims to
27. For an excellent historical treatment, see Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A
Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 763-64 (1970); see also Stevens,
supra note 2, at 195-97.
28. J. INST. 2.1.
Things become the private property of individuals in many ways; for the titles by
which we acquire ownership in them are some of them titles of natural law, which, as
we said, is called the law of nations, while some of them are titles of civil law....
[N]atural law is clearly the older, having been instituted by nature at the first origin
of mankind, whereas civil laws first came into existence when states began to be
founded, magistrates to be created, and laws to be written.
Id. at 2.1.11.
29. Id. at 2.1.7-.12. Sacred things such as "churches and votive offerings" as well as
"[w]ild animals, birds, and fish" (before capture), were considered to be no one's property but
the property of all. Id.
30. Id. at 2.1.7.
31. Id. at 2.1.1-.2.
Thus, the following things are... common to all-the air, running water, the sea, and
consequently the sea-shore. No one therefore is forbidden access to the seashore,
provided he abstains from injury to houses, monuments, and buildings generally; for
these are not, like the sea itself, subject to the law of nations. On the other hand, all
rivers and harbours are public, so that all persons have a right to fish therein.
Id.
32. Note, supra note 27, at 764.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 764-65.
35. Id.
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commerce, navigation, and fisheries.3 6
By the time of the Magna Carta, however, navigational commerce had
begun to increase dramatically.37 In order to aid the free flow of commerce,
the Magna Carta prohibited obstructions to navigation, such as fishing
weirs, 31 from rivers and channels.3 9 As commerce continued to develop in
England, the public trust doctrine reemerged along with it. The king came
to be viewed as the protector of public rights and, although he had the right
to grant title to land below the navigable waters, the right of the grantee
remained subservient to the public rights of fishing and navigation.' ° Thus,
while the lands subject to the public trust were in fact alienable, the trust
itself was not.
Whereas res communes was not a particularly difficult concept for the Ro-
mans, the English common law system seemed to reject public ownership
and instead required private ownership of property." The law thus created
the fiction that the ownership of all soil below navigable waters was in the
king.42 The king as protector became the king as sovereign trustee4 3 for the
public rights.'
The title, therefore, orjusprivatum, in the underlying lands of the sea and
its arms, was in the king as owner. The dominion, though, orjus publicum,
over those lands was in the king as trustee.4" As Professor Sax4 6 pointed
36. Id.
37. Id. at 765.
38. Weirs are enclosures set in waterways or other structures attached to underwater river
beds. 7 C. DAVIS, H. COBLENTZ & 0. TITELBAUM, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 324
(1976).
39. J. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 49 (1965); see also Note, supra note 27, at 766.
40. J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE WATERS 33-34 (3d
ed. 1826); see Note, supra note 27, at 768.
41. Stevens, supra note 2, at 197-98.
42. Id. at 198.
43. The recognized authority on the English law of the public trust, Lord Hale, put it
thus:
The right of fishing in this sea and the creeks and arms thereof is originally lodged in
the crown, as the right of depasturing is originally lodged in the owner of the wast
[sic] whereof he is lord, or as the right of fishing belongs to him that is the owner of a
private or inland river.
Hale, De Jure Marls, in A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE 376-77 (S. Moore ed. 1888).
44. Id. Lord Hale was quoted approvingly in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894).
45. Shively, 152 U.S. at 11. In this sense, the king enjoyed a dual interest in the underly-
ing lands: The private title to the property, expressed in terms of the jus privatum; and a
sovereign interest in trust for the benefit of the people, expressed as the jus publicum. See A
HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE 643-44 (S. Moore ed. 1888). Thejus privatum is normally re-
ferred to in terms of private ownership of water beds which are still susceptible of private fee in
limited circumstances. Although "the king hath prima facie this right in the arms and creeks
of the sea," the jus privatum in a private citizen is possible by sovereign grant or by natural
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out, whatever powers or restrictions the king may have possessed, it was
nonetheless within Parliament's authority, acting under what would now be
considered the "police power, to enlarge or diminish the public rights for
some legitimate public purpose."'4 7 The dynamic established by the king as
trustee, and Parliament as regulator, created confusion in American trust
jurisprudence when the states adopted the common law.4"
The American system is a hybrid of the Roman and English conceptions
of the public trust.49 In the American system, the English common law
rights passed to the colonies.5° Similar rights passed under the royal char-
ters in trust for the future communities.5" At the time of the Revolution,
these rights became vested in the states.
52
C. The Equal Footing Doctrine
The plaintiffs in Pollard v. Hagan 53 claimed title to once-tidal-flowed
property in Alabama through a congressional patent.54 The Court held that
Congress had no authority to grant public trust lands within the state's juris-
diction to private parties." It stated that the shores of navigable waters, and
the land under them, were not constitutionally granted to the United States,
but were reserved to each of the states respectively. 6 Further, the Court
held that the new states possessed the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdic-
accretion. Hale, supra note 43, at 384-85. For further sources on natural and unnatural
changes to the shore, see sources cited infra note 174.
46. Professor Joseph L. Sax, formerly of the University of Michigan, currently at the
University of California, Berkeley, is widely recognized as this country's leading authority on
the public trust doctrine. His notable articles include the seminal work, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law. Effective Judicial Intervention, supra note 1, and Sax, Liber-
ating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185
(1980). See also J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1971).
47. Sax, supra note 1, at 476 (emphasis added).
48. Id.; see Note, supra note 27, at 774-75; infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text
(American adaptation of common law applies disparate notions of navigability).
49. Note, supra note 27, at 774-75; see also Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 413
(1842) (private claim to oyster bed in public river rejected as violative of public rights to navi-
gation and fisheries).
50. See infra text accompanying notes 58-73.
51. Id.
52. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894); see Martin, 41 U.S. at 410 ("For when the
Revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves sovereign; and in that char-
acter hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their
own common use ... ").
53. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
54. Id. at 219-20.
55. Id. at 230.
56. Id.
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tion over these properties as the original states.5 7 This ruling remained un-
disturbed in the ninety-five years since the Pollard decision.5"
Revisiting the issue in the more recent case of Utah Division of State
Lands v. United States,59 the Court considered whether the equal footing
doctrine permitted the state of Utah to claim that it acquired title to a navi-
gable lake bed within its jurisdiction as against the federal government.'
The Court noted that there existed a strong presumption against federal con-
veyance of a navigable bed attached to a private claim unless such intention
was unambiguously declared by the United States.6 This case, however,
involved Congress' selection of Utah Lake as a reservoir site under the Sun-
dry Appropriation Act of 1888 prior to Utah's admission to the Union.
62
On the facts of the case, the Court concluded that the act at issue did not
contain sufficiently clear language to defeat Utah's claim.63 The Court
reemphasized its traditional equal footing position as a doctrine deeply
rooted in the history of Roman and English common law.6'
The long line of equal footing cases has consistently maintained that the
rights and privileges of the original thirteen states, with respect to navigable
57. Id.; accord Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15 (1935); Appleby v.
City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 381 (1926); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435
(1892); see also Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 471, 477-78 (1850).
58. See, e.g., Borax, 296 U.S. at 15; Appleby, 271 U.S. at 381.
59. 107 S. Ct. 2318 (1987).
60. Id. at 2320.
61. Id. at 2321; see also Sax, supra note 1, at 486.
62. Utah, 107 S. Ct. at 2321-22; see Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552-53
(1981); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.
1, 49-50 (1894). See generally Note, Title to the Soil Under Public Waters: A Question of Fact,
2 MINN. L. REV. 313 (1918); Note, Title to the Soil Under Public Waters: The Trust Theory, 2
MINN. L. REV. 429 (1918).
63. Utah, 107 S. Ct. at 2324. The Court recognized Congress' historical policy of holding
lands under navigable waters for the benefit of future states. Id. at 2323; see Shively, 152 U.S.
at 49-50.
64. Utah, 107 S. Ct. at 2320 (citing Shively, 152 U.S. at 11-14; Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S.
(3 How.) 212 (1845)).
The equal footing doctrine is deeply rooted in history, and the proper application of
the doctrine requires an understanding of its origins. Under English common law,
the English Crown held sovereign title to all lands underlying navigable waters. Be-
cause title to such land was important to the sovereign's ability to control navigation,
fishing, and other commercial activity on rivers and lakes, ownership of this land was
considered an essential attribute of sovereignty. Title to such land was therefore
vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole people.
Id.; see also Brief for Respondent, State of Mississippi at 19, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Missis-
sippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988) (No. 86-870) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief]. The rights to oil
and gas leases for the submerged river bed were at issue in Utah. 107 S. Ct. at 2322; cf
Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 793 (lucrative mineral leasing rights prompted Mississippi to assert its
public trust interest).
1989]
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waters, passed to the newly formed states upon admission to the Union.
Those rights and privileges derived from the English common law but were
expanded or limited by the individual states as public trustee.65 The new
states acquired an affirmative duty to control trust property for the benefit of
their people, subject only to the limitations placed upon them by the United
States Constitution.66
In the seminal American public trust case, Shively v. Bowlby,67 the
Supreme Court reiterated its view that the original states acquired a public
trust over soil below the high tide line. Similarly, property acquired by acts
of the federal government was held in trust for the newly formed states.68
Once the new states were formed, that trust transferred to the states on an
equal footing with the original thirteen for appropriate public administra-
tion.69 At issue in Shively was whether a congressional land grant to a pri-
vate citizen in pre-statehood Oregon vested any property rights in land
below the high tide as against a subsequent grant from the state.7" The
Court held that while Congress possessed the authority to grant public trust
lands in its territories, it had never done so. 7 I Any grants made of land
bordering tidelands did not impair the title and dominion of the newly cre-
ated state." Under the equal footing doctrine, the states admitted into the
Union after the adoption of the Constitution acquired the same rights as the
original thirteen states in the lands under tide waters within their respective
65. Although a minority of the original 13 states have chosen to limit the common law
doctrine (Massachusetts and Maine limited public ownership to land below low tide as opposed
to high tide), most states have followed the common law. As a recognized extension of the
public trust doctrine, for example, it is well established that any conveyance of trust lands to
private parties must be made by the state legislature as public trustee. Appleby v. City of New
York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926). Normally, a valid public purpose must exist for a legislative con-
veyance to pass judicial muster. Id.; see, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453
(1892) (legislatively granted land beneath Lake Michigan held to be a revocable fee). But see
Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning
the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986); Roberts, Beaches: The Efficiency of the
Common Law and Other Fairy Tales, 28 UCLA L. REV. 169 (1980); Rose, The Comedy of the
Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986)
(criticizing the expansion of sovereign dominion over trust property as inefficient and histori-
cally unjustified).
66. Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 435. The commerce clause states that, "Congress shall
have the power ... [t]o regulate Commerce... among the several [s]tates." U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 8, cl. 3. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-80 (1979) (discussing the scope
of the federal navigational servitude).
67. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
68. Id. at 26, 57.
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jurisdictions.73
II. THE STATES AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
In order to determine the extent of the public trust property in which the
newly formed states acquired an interest, it is necessary to examine the origi-
nal states' perception of the common law and the modifications made to it by
the thirteen new sovereigns.74
A. The Original States Define the Doctrine's Scope: Navigability
Because of a geographic anomaly, the definition of navigable waters in
England rested on tidal ebb and flow. All significant "arms of the sea" and
navigable rivers used for purposes of commerce were physically subject to
tidal influence. 75 As a result, non-navigable rivers, streams, and ponds
which were not embraced by the public trust doctrine and the land below
them became susceptible to private ownership. Furthermore, the king as-
sumed no interest for the preservation of public fishing, navigation, or com-
merce. Thus, the terms "navigable waters" and "tidal waters" became
interchangeable when speaking of the scope of the sovereign interest.76
In colonial America, legislatures sought to define the adopted public trust
in terms which were consistent with their geographical realities and with
their commercial and recreational needs. In Massachusetts, the colonial leg-
islature amended the common law definition of the high-tide line as the sea-
ward boundary of private ownership. 77 The ordinance extended private
ownership to the mean low-tide mark in order to facilitate and encourage the
development of wharves and piers for commercial activity. 78 The ordinance
73. Id. at 57.
74. See id. at 11-26. "[T]here is no universal and uniform law upon the subject; but...
each State has dealt with the lands under the tide waters ... according to its own views of
justice and policy .. " Id. at 26.
75. See Petitioners' Brief, supra note 7, at 19-23; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Thirteen
Original States in Support of Respondents at 4-5, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S.
Ct. 791 (1988) (No. 86-870) [hereinafter Amicus Brief of Original States]. But see Respon-
dent's Brief, supra note 64, at 11-13.
76. See The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 454-55 (1851).
It has been argued that the emphasis on "ebb and flow" in the English common law cases and
their commentary was mere convenience, not intended to denote anything beyond the com-
mercial navigability of a particular waterway. Id. at 455; see also Petitioners' Brief, supra note
7, at 17-18.
77. Shively, 152 U.S. 18-19 (citing Great Pond Ordinance of 1641 (current version at
MASS. GEN. L., ch. 131, § 45 (1985))).
78. See Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891) (upholding state jurisdiction to
regulate fisheries from a league within the "coast"); Richardson v. Boston, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
263, 269 (1857) (public right of navigation, between high and low tide, was defeasible at any
time by the subsequent landowners).
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specifically excluded public rights to fishing, fowling, and navigation from
private ownership, thereby reserving a direct sovereign interest in the lands
below high tide.79 In so doing, the Commonwealth recognized its authority
to regulate such public rights in non-navigable, tidal waters. 80
In Rhode Island, as with the majority of the original thirteen states, case
law consistently recognized the rights of the public to tidelands below the
mean high-water mark."1 Additionally, the Rhode Island Constitution spe-
cifically protected the public privileges of the shore which were available at
common law and by prior use. 82 Some states, such as New Hampshire, be-
gan to draw a distinction between salt and fresh waters. Case law has long
recognized that tide waters are public waters, 3 whereas the appropriate test
for sovereign interest in fresh waters is navigability-in-fact.8 4 New York de-
79. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 82-88 (1853); see also Amicus
Brief of Original States, supra note 75, at 6.
80. See Commonwealth v. Vincent, 108 Mass. 441, 447 (1871); see also Amicus Brief of
Original States, supra note 75, at 7. But see Rowe v. Granite Bridge Corp., 38 Mass. (21 Pick.)
344, 347 (1839) (limiting public trust interest to navigable waters which are navigable for some
trade or agricultural purpose).
81. See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17:
The people shall continue to enjoy and freely exercise all the rights of fishery, and the
privileges of the shore, to which they have been heretofore entitled under the charter
and usages of this state, including but not limited to fishing from the shore, the gath-
ering of seaweed, leaving the shore to swim in the sea and passage along the shore;
and they shall be secure in their rights to the use and enjoyment of the natural re-
sources of the state with due regard for the preservation of their values; and it shall
be the duty of the general assembly to provide for the conservation of the air, land,
water, plant, animal, mineral and other resources of the state, and to adopt all means
necessary and proper by law to protect the natural environment of the people of the
state ....
Id.; see also Jackvony v. Powel, 67 R.I. 218, 223, 21 A.2d 554, 556 (1941); Gerhard v. Seekonk
Bridge Comm'rs, 15 R.I. 334, 335, 5 A. 199, 200-01 (1886); Folsom v. Freeborn, 13 R.I. 200,
204 (1881); Bailey v. Burges, 11 R.I. 330, 331 (1876); Engs v. Peckham, 11 R.I. 210 (1875).
82. See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17; see also Jackvony, 67 R.I. at 225, 21 A.2d at 557. Con-
necticut adopted a tidal definition of navigability for public trust purposes and rejected naviga-
bility-in-fact. See Prior v. Swartz, 62 Conn. 132, 138-40, 25 A. 398, 399 (1892) (although state
maintains rights in land below high water, upland owner may "wharf out" onto the tidelands);
Adams v. Pease, 2 Conn. 481, 483-84 (1818).
83. See Sibson v. State, 110 N.H. 8, 10, 259 A.2d 397, 399 (1969); Nudd v. Hobbs, 17
N.H. 524, 526 (1845).
84. Georgia followed the New Hampshire distinction between fresh and salt waters, judg-
ing tidal waters against an ebb and flow standard and non-tidal waters by navigability-in-fact.
See Alabama v. Georgia, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 505, 515 (1859); Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 381, 411 (1851); Oemler v. Green, 134 Ga. 198, 67 S.E. 433 (1910); see also 1902 Ga.
Laws 108; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-8-8 (1982); Amicus Brief of Original States, supra note 75, at
22.
New Jersey law has consistently held that the ebb and flow of the tide determines sovereign
interest. But non-tidal waters are outside the scope of the public trust. New Jersey has chosen
not to follow the New Hampshire navigability test for fresh waters. See Stevens v. Paterson &
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fined its trust interest in shorelands by reference to tidality alone.85 Legal
navigability signified tidal influence, not navigability-in-fact.8 6
The law of the original thirteen states, which serves as the "divining rod"
of the public trust for purposes of the equal footing doctrine, 7 seemed to
emphasize tidality over navigability.88 The major commercial activity of the
predominantly coastal thirteen states centered on tidal waters.8 9 While Mas-
sachusetts and New Hampshire, most notably, recognized public trust rights
Newark R.R., 34 N.J.L. 532, 537 (1870); Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369, 378 (1867); see
also Amicus Brief of Original States, supra note 75, at 13-15.
85. See Amicus Brief of Original States, supra note 75, at 11-13.
86. Pennsylvania declared that tidal waters form part of the "common highway" which is
vested in the state. Ball v. Slack, 2 Whart. 508, 539 (Pa. 1837); Amicus Brief of Original
States, supra note 75, at 16-17; see also Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. 21, 30 (1869);
Wainwright v. McCullough, 63 Pa. 66, 74 (1869). Delaware recognized private ownership of
the lands between the high and low water marks but maintained an inalienable interest in that
property in trust for the public. This intertidal soil was considered to be subject to a trust
servitude. See Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 251 (1829); Phil-
lips v. State, 449 A.2d 250, 255 (Del. 1982); Bailey v. Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore
R.R., 4 Del. (1 Harr.) 389, 395 (Del. 1846) (all navigable rivers belong to the state); see also
Amicus Brief of Original States, supra note 75, at 18.
Maryland also recognized private ownership in navigable water but such conveyances by the
state were considered to be forever "subject to the public rights of navigation and fishery." See
Potomac Steamboat Co. v. Upper Potomac Steamboat Co., 109 U.S. 672, 675 (1883) (soils
below low water held by the state for public fishing); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71,
74 (1855); Board of Pub. Works v. Larmar Corp., 262 Md. 24, 47, 277 A.2d 427, 438 (1971);
see also Amicus Brief of Original States, supra note 75, at 19. Legal navigability in Maryland
means where the tide ebbs and flows.
Virginia recognized the public trust in shorelands along the sea, bay, or any river or creek
within the commonwealth. It also subjected adjacent lands to the public rights of fishing,
fowling, and hunting. See McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 394-95 (1876) (state owns tide
waters for benefit of its people subject only to commerce clause restrictions); Garrison v. Hall,
75 Va. 150, 160 (1881); French v. Bankhead, 52 Va. 65, 73, 11 Gratt. 136, 159 (1854) (upland
owner has fee out to low water with wharfing-out privileges); see also Bradford v. Nature
Conservancy, 224 Va. 181, 294 S.E.2d 866 (1982).
North Carolina defined legal navigability as land subject to the tide as far as the salt water
flows. State v. Twiford, 136 N.C. 603, 48 S.E. 586 (1904); Shepard's Point Land Co. v. Atlan-
tic Hotel, 132 N.C. 517, 44 S.E. 39 (1903); State v. Glen, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 321 (1859);
Hatfield v. Grimsted, 29 N.C. (7 Ired.) 139 (1846) (upland owner owns up to high water
mark); Collins v. Benbury, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 277 (1842); Ingram v. Threadgill, 14 N.C. (3
Dev.) 59 (1831); see Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 30 (1828); see also Amicus Brief of
Original States, supra note 75, at 21.
South Carolina looked to the "daily ebb and flow of the tide." See State v. Pinckney, 22 S.C.
484, 508 (1884); State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S.C. 50 (1884) (upland ownership extends only
to high water); see also Amicus Brief of Original States, supra note 75, at 51.
87. See Petitioners' Brief, supra note 7, at 23.
88. See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876) ("The confusion of navigable with tide
water, found in the monuments of the common law, long prevailed in this country, notwith-
standing the broad differences existing between the extent and topography of the British is-
lands and that of the American continent.").
89. See infra note 119.
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on non-tidal waters, the commercial insignificance of the fresh water bodies
in early trust law resulted in unacceptably vague language for the newer
states, many of which had lakes and rivers which were the functional
equivalent of the oceans, bays, and harbors of the original thirteen states.
In The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,9 the Supreme Court consid-
ered for the first time9 whether it was constitutionally permissible for Con-
gress to extend admiralty jurisdiction to non-tidal, navigable waters.92 The
Court recognized that, although the common law spoke of tidal influence,
there was nothing particularly unique in the ebb and flow of the tide that
made waters suitable for admiralty jurisdiction.9 3 The Genesee Court held
that to limit such jurisdiction to tidal waters would be to ignore the vast
commerce which took place on many of the great inland waterways. 94 More
significantly, it would place the coastal states on an "unequal footing" with
the inland states.95 The inland states and their citizens would be denied the
jurisdictional benefits which were constitutionally secured to the Atlantic
states.
96
Subsequent Courts found the Genesee approach of extending admiralty
jurisdiction to inland, navigable waters sufficient for designating such waters
as "navigable" for purposes of the public trust. In Barney v. Keokuk, 97 the
Supreme Court considered whether the City of Keokuk could properly fill
90. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). The Court went on to justify its emphasis on
navigability:
In England, undoubtedly the writers upon the subject, and the decisions in its courts
of admiralty, always speak of the jurisdiction as confined to tide-water. And this
definition in England was a sound and reasonable one, because there was no naviga-
ble stream in the country beyond the ebb and flow of the tide; nor any place where a
port could be established to carry on trade with a foreign nation, and where vessels
could enter or depart with cargoes. In England, therefore tide-water and navigable
water are synonymous terms, and tide-water, with a few small and unimportant ex-
ceptions, meant nothing more than public rivers, as contradistinguished from private
ones; and they took the ebb and flow of the tide as the test, because it was a conve-
nient one, and more easily determined the character of the river.
Id. at 454-55.
91. Id. at 453.
92. Id. at 443, 454; see Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 20, 5 Stat. 726 (expanding District Court
jurisdiction over non-tidal, navigable lakes and waterways). Lake Ontario was the waterway
at issue in Genesee. The Court went on to identify the Great Lakes as "in truth inland seas...
[with] [d]ifferent States border[ing] on them on one side, and a foreign nation on the other."
Genesee, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 453.
93. Genesee, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 454.
94. Id.
95. Id.; see also Petitioners' Brief, supra note 7, at 34-35.
96. Genesee, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 454; see also Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338
(1876).
97. 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
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land on the Mississippi River for use as a public street. 98 Conceding that the
common law definition of navigable waters and the application of that defini-
tion by the original states were limited to tidal property, the Court nonethe-
less recognized that title to land below nontidal, navigable waters belonged
to the state by virtue of its sovereignty. 99 The Court held that the Keokuk
authorities, as representatives of the public, had the right to fill in the dis-
puted waterway in order to extend a public street."
The Supreme Court extended the Genesee rationale in Illinois Central
Railroad v. Illinois. 101 The Court considered whether an act of the Illinois
legislature, conveying the soil below Lake Michigan on Chicago's waterfront
to the railroad, effected an irrevocable grant of fee simple." 2 The Court
applied the Genesee reasoning for extending the public trust to navigable,
inland waterways.'03 The question remained, however, whether the legisla-
ture could revoke the grant."° The Court answered that "control of the
State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels
as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be dis-
posed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the
lands and waters remaining. '"105
A similar grant of trust lands to a private party allowed the Supreme
Court to refine the Illinois Central holding. Appleby v. City of New York 106
involved a city grant of tidelands with the state legislature's approval.'0 7 In
approving the legislative authority to alienate lands within the public trust,
the Court recognized that the Illinois Central decision would allow such a
98. Id. at 325.
99. Id. at 338.
100. Id. at 339.
101. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
102. Id. at 451-52. "The question, therefore, to be considered is whether the legislature
was competent to thus deprive the State of its ownership of the submerged lands ... whether
the... corporation can hold the lands... against any future exercises of power over them by
the State." Id. at 452.
103. Id. at 435-37.
104. Id. at 452.
105. Id. at 453; see also Stevens, supra note 2, at 212. Stevens lays out a two-part test for
evaluating the validity of legislative grants of trust lands:
(1) Does the disposition affirmatively aid or improve the public interest in naviga-
tion or other public use of the particular area of the waterway beneath the ordinary
high watermark?
(2) If the legislative grant does not affirmatively aid or improve the public trust,
does the disposition substantially impair the public interest in the remaining land and
waters of the particular area of the waterway?
Id.; see also City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr.
327, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980).
106. 271 U.S. 364 (1926).
107. Id. at 366-67.
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conveyance but only if the benefits of private ownership would substantially
serve the public interest. 108
Additionally, the Appleby Court enunciated the model for judicial skepti-
cism,10 9 which was suggested in Illinois Central, as the test for scrutinizing
the alienation of public trust lands. The approach is one of strict scrutiny
for protecting the public interest against legislative sale of important public
resources. "o The two decisions also illustrated the modem perception of the
state as public trustee and its concomitant duties as protector of the public
interest.'1 ' The Court found it proper for the state to convey public trust
lands, but only to the extent to which such a conveyance was an express
grant of the legislature, and to the extent that the legislative grant passed the
Illinois Central-Appleby strict judicial scrutiny standard." 2 The lands once
conveyed, however, remain impressed with an inalienable public trust.
Should the public interest ever require inquiry into the propriety of the con-
veyance, 11 revocation to restore the public interest may be available without
the necessity of operating under the eminent domain power and the evolving
"takings" analysis."
14
The courts have attempted to define the sovereign interest in terms of both
the nature and scope of the states' duty as well as its geographical limita-
tions." 5 The American version of the public trust doctrine thus shifted
from the common law restriction of tidality to embrace the many rivers,
lakes, and other waterways suitable for navigation. Navigability, it would
appear, had become the sine qua non of trust lands, at least with respect to
inland waters." 6
108. Id. at 393-99; see also Connors & High, Public Trust Doctrine and Private Rights, 16
REAL EST. REV. 51, 53 (1987).
109. 271 U.S. at 384; Conners & High, supra note 108, at 53; Utah Div. of State Lands v.
United States, 107 S. Ct. 2318, 2321 (1987); see United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49
(1926); see also Sax, supra note 1, at 490.
110. See Stevens, supra note 2, at 215 (suggesting that fear of legislative corruption may
have had as much to do with the adoption of this model of judicial skepticism as the impor-
tance of the public resource itself).
111. See Connors & High, supra note 108, at 53.
112. See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980) (rejection of a 22,000-acre tideland conveyance in
San Francisco Bay for lack of clear legislative intent); People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal.
576, 138 P. 79 (1913) (legislative intent must be clearly expressed or necessarily implied); see
also Stevens, supra note 2, at 219-20.
113. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453-54 (1892). But see City of Long
Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 482, 476 P.2d 423, 437, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 37 (1970) (trust
lands conveyed pursuant to legislative finding of unsuitability for trust purposes may be con-
veyed free of the public trust).
114. See supra note 2.
115. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
116. See Petitioners' Brief, supra note 7, at 18-23.
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While the original states uniformly reserved tidelands for the benefit of the
public, their approach to non-tidal waters was less consistent. These states,
however, are all coastal states and their adoption and modification of the
common law was in no small measure affected by their interests in commer-
cial navigation and commercial fishing activities.117 It is not surprising then
that the several states maintained their ports and access to them in "trust"
not only for the interest of public access to the shore, 18 but also for the
important economic control of these resources which was so vital to the
states' commercial survival.119
Equating navigability with tidality was a mere convenience for the coastal
states.120 For most of the remaining thirty-seven states, however, vast in-
land water resources fell outside the scope of the tidality limitation. 21  The
law of the original thirteen was inadequate to address these resources. For
the new states, navigability became the essence of the public trust. 22 The
tension between the ebb-and-flow standard and the navigability-in-fact stan-
dard illustrated either the internal inconsistency of the doctrine itself or the
retooling of an ancient concept to meet evolving public needs.
B. Trust Purposes
Traditionally, the public trust recognized the paramount sovereign inter-
ests of commerce, navigation, and fishing.1 23 But, as the commercial and
recreational demands of aquatic natural resources began to increase with a
growth in population, the public trust purpose began to evolve to answer
those changing demands.
117. See supra notes 89-104 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Hale, supra note 43, at 833-89 (protection of public rights to the shore for
bathing, digging sand and shells, and collecting seaweed); see also R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17
(protecting the recognized right to gather seaweed along the shore).
119. The great urban centers of the 13 original states developed around the seaports and
harbors along the Atlantic coast. In order to maintain open access to these commercial re-
sources, the states encouraged and enforced the availability of the tidelands for the construc-
tion of wharves and piers, albeit subject to paramount state rights to the tidelands. J. ANGELL,
supra note 40, at 236-37; Richardson v. Boston, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 263, 269-70 (1856); Prior v.
Swartz, 62 Conn. 132, 136-37, 25 A. 398, 399-400 (1892); Folsom v. Freeborn, 13 R.I. 200,
204-05 (1881).
120. It also served to broaden the scope of the sovereign fee, which, in many areas, would
be outside the intertidal zone if strict navigability-in-fact were the standard. By employing the
"convenient" ebb-and-flow approach, a state could greatly expand the acreage available for
trust uses.
121. See supra note 92.
122. See The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
123. See J. INST., supra note 28, at 2.1.1-.6; see also Connors & High, supra note 108, at 51;
Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 382 (1925) (the rights of the people are to navi-
gate, to fish, and to use the public waters as public highways).
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The California Supreme Court introduced the modern approach to ex-
panding trust uses. In Marks v. Whitney, 124 the court recognized that the
public trust could not be limited to its traditional uses; the tidelands were too
significant a resource for the court to ignore growing public needs. 125 Marks
brought suit to quiet title to tideland property in order to fill and develop
it. 126 Whitney opposed the assertion of title on the ground that it would
infringe on his littoral rights as adjoining landowner and his rights as a
member of the public. 127 Whitney sought a judicial declaration that the land
in question was burdened with a public trust easement. 12  After setting
aside the standing issue, 129 the court declared that the public trust properly
included the rights to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, boat, and enjoy general
recreation. '
30
Additionally, the court noted that the public uses to which tidelands are
subject were sufficiently flexible to encompass changing needs. 13' As a re-
sult, the increasing demand for ecological preservation of tidelands ade-
quately fit within the scope of public interest so that protection for that
purpose remained consistent with the public trust. 132 The court declined to
define all the uses which might properly fall within the ambit of public pur-
pose but indicated forcefully that the trust encumbrance embraced evolving
social priorities.
13
The Marks decision prompted a lively debate among jurists, legislators,
and resource managers as to the proper scope of public trust purposes.
While Marks presented a vision of the doctrine as a flexible tool to fulfill a
124. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
125. Id. at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
126. Id. at 256, 491 P.2d at 377, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 261, 491 P.2d at 381-82, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 798 (members of the public may bring
an action to enforce public trust rights); see Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. California, 437
F.2d 1087, 1095-98 (9th Cir. 1971) (private action to restrain filling of bay and to declare
public rights to waterways upheld); Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84
Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970) (private action to quiet title to private and public easements in a public
beach).
130. Marks, 6 Cal. 3d at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 766; see also Jackvony v.
Powel, 67 R.I. 218, 21 A.2d 554 (1941).
131. Marks, 6 Cal. 3d at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
132. Id. The court pointed out that ecological control, open space preservation, and scenic
preservation are all legitimate and important public purposes. Id.
133. Id.; see also M. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY
110-11 (1985); Wilson, Private Property and the Public Trust: A Theory for Preserving the
Coastal Zone, 4 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 57 (1984); Comment, Sand Rights: Using Cali-
fornia's Public Trust Doctrine to Protect Against Coastal Erosion, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 727
(1987). See generally Sax, supra note I.
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wide range of social needs,1 34 some commentators have suggested that ex-
tending the doctrine beyond the traditional commercial function is a danger-
ous usurpation of private property rights by the state.
13 5
One area receiving a great deal of attention has been public access to the
shore. As coastal development increased dramatically over the past fifteen
years, the competing interests of public access and the "right to exclude,"1
3 6
an essential stick in the bundle of property rights, have resulted in much
litigation.' 37 As states have attempted to regulate coastal property, the pub-
lic trust doctrine has been invoked to justify intrusions on otherwise private
property in order to preserve access to trust lands. 138  Although some states
constitutionally mandate public access to the shore,139 and despite congres-
sional attempts to promote public access,"4 heightened judicial scrutiny of
fifth amendment takings claims has worked to slow regulatory programs
designed to ensure public access.
14 1
The trust flexibility noted in Marks has led to other definitions of trust
purposes. Where diversion of non-navigable tributaries negatively impacted
upon the public trust uses of downstream lakes and rivers, the California
Supreme Court found a violation of the public trust.142 Similarly, the Wis-
134. See Stevens, supra note 2, at 196 n.6; Andrews, EPA Authority and Responsibility
Under the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 10 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 249 (1977);
Hannig, The Public Trust Doctrine Expansion and Integration: A Proposed Balancing Test, 23
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 211 (1983); Comment, Public Beach Access Exactions: Extending the
Public Trust Doctrine to Vindicate Public Rights, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1049 (1981); see also
Federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (1982); National Environ-
mental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1) (1982).
135. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 65; Rose, supra note 65; Note, Lyon and Fogerty: Un-
precedented Extensions of the Public Trust, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1138 (1982).
136. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) (cit-
ing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). One commentator has suggested
that this right in property allows its "commander 'to look any man in the eye and tell him to
go to hell.'" BALL, supra note 133, at 108 (quoting W. LIPPMANN, THE METHOD OF FREE-
DOM 101-02 (1934)).
137. See Mathews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355 (1984) (in
order for public to enjoy its public trust rights, it must have access to dry sand as well as
shore), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1989); Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294
A.2d 47 (1972) (public trust mandates that ocean waters be open to the public on equal terms).
138. See supra note 136. Most states define the locus of trust land as waterward of the high
tide line. Only two states define the limit at low tide. See supra note 65; see also Singer, The
Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 675 (1988) ("The public relies on the
creation or continuation of social and legal relationships between property owners and non-
owners which protect the rights of the public in continued access to those resources.").
139. See, e.g., R.I. CONST. art 1, § 17; CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4.
140. See Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2)(d) (1986).
141. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) (Commission's
public easement demand effected a taking); see supra note 2.
142. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal.
1989]
Catholic University Law Review
consin Court of Appeals upheld an ordinance, against state challenge, which
zoned a portion of a public lake exclusively for water ski exhibitions. 143 The
court recognized the public benefits of the ordinance and also noted that the
exclusive zoning effectively made private a portion of the lake, thereby elimi-
nating certain trust uses.144 It balanced the public harm and public benefit
of conflicting uses, while recognizing that the trust must remain flexible. 4 '
In so doing, the court articulated what has become the current model of
judicial review for expanding trust purposes.' 46
Some commentators have expressed concern over this ad hoc judicial ap-
proach to expanding trust uses and have recommended instead, legislatively
chartered state agencies to review and evaluate trust concerns. 14 7 Nonethe-
less, courts have consistently recognized that it is within the authority of the
state to determine the direction of public trust lands in its jurisdiction to the
extent that uses promote the public interest.14
8
III. Mississippi ASSERTS DOMINION OVER TIDAL PROPERTY
In 1973, the Mississippi legislature enacted the Coastal Wetlands Protec-
tion Law,' 49 which authorized the state's Marine Resources Council to pro-
duce aerial maps from which to determine the geographical boundaries of
Mississippi's vast wetlands. The purpose of the legislation and the map
making was to take stock of and evaluate the state's wetlands in order to
plan for environmental protection. 5 0 Instead, the Mineral Leasing Com-
mission used these maps to define the limits of the state's public trust interest
so that it could lease mineral rights to third parties.' Saga Petroleum en-
tered into a lease with the Commission shortly thereafter on Cinque Bam-
Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 413 (1983). Audubon involved a 35% reduction in the sur-
face area of Mono Lake as a result of California water policy that allowed diversion of streams
tributary to the lake. Id. at 421, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349. The effects were both
aesthetically and ecologically devastating. Id.; see Young, The Troubled Waters of Mono Lake,
NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Oct. 1981, at 504.
143. State v. Village of Lake Delton, 93 Wis. 2d 78, 286 N.W.2d 622 (Ct. App. 1979).
144. Id. at 74, 286 N.W.2d at 628.
145. Id. at 76, 286 N.W.2d at 630.
146. See, e.g., Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983); State v.
Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696 (extending public trust control over
four thousand miles of shorezone, swamp, and overflowed lands against private ownership),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981).
147. See Connors & High, supra note 108, at 58.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 101-22; see also Singer, supra note 138, at 674-75.
149. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-27-1 to 69 (Supp. 1985).
150. Id.
151. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 511 (1986), aff'd sub nom.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
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bini's land.152 Cinque Bambini's title ran back 150 years. 153 During that
period, all applicable property taxes had been paid in full. 154 No claim had
ever been made against this property either by an arm of the state or by any
individual, privately or on behalf of the public interest.155 In 1813, prior to
Mississippi statehood, the predecessors in title to the Cinque Bambini Part-
nership 56 had settled and claimed more than 2,400 acres of property bor-
dering on what is now known as Bayou LaCroix, Bayou Enceinte, Long Gar
Bayou, and the south branch of the Jourdan River in southwestern Missis-
sippi, all tributary to the Gulf of Mexico.' 57 In 1977, when record title was
in Cinque Bambini, the Mississippi Mineral Lease Commission, purportedly
acting pursuant to statutory authority,'58 issued oil and gas leases to Saga
Petroleum U.S., Inc. for the lands in question. The partnership and other
interested parties then brought suit to quiet title to the newly leased lands.' 59
Despite what would appear to be settled property expectations, the state of
Mississippi asserted fee to the tidelands at issue as public trustee, implicitly
recognizing a public purpose to mineral leasing revenue."
A. Mississippi Answers'the Navigability Problem: Hoisting a Sail
Upon a Toothpick 161
The Mississippi Chancery Court ruled in Cinque Bambini Partnership v.
State 162 that the public trust doctrine vested title to 140 acres of the disputed
152. Id.
153. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, No. 14,178 (Ch. Miss. 1982) (reprinted in Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Mississippi at 41a, Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988) (No. 86-870) [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari]; see
Petitioners' Brief, supra note 7, at 16.
154. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 7, at 37.
155. Id.
156. Other investors included the individual partners of Cinque Bambini Partnership,
Spooner Petroleum Co., and Enserch Exploration, Inc. See Petition for Certiorari, supra note
153, at 294.
157. Id. at 29a, 30a-32a.
158. Id. at 31a.
159. Id. at 29a-31a.
160. See Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 512, (Miss. 1986), aff'd sub
nom. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988). Although the cases have
never directly discussed pure economic benefit as a legitimate purpose, nothing in public trust
jurisprudence would seem to contravene the assertion that economic control of tideland re-
sources is properly within the scope of the sovereign interest. In fact, this emphasis on com-
mercial control is an historical link to the traditional "commerce" purpose, which the common
law and American courts protected by broadly applying the public trust doctrine. See also
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
161. Cinque Barbini, 491 So. 2d at 515.
162. Id. at 510-11.
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tidelands in the state by virtue of the equal footing doctrine. 6 3 The state
supreme court reversed with respect to ninety-eight acres, holding that land
brought artificially within the ebb and flow of the tide remained in the up-
land land owner. The court affirmed state ownership to forty-two acres of
tidally influenced wetland,"' ruling that as a matter of state and federal
law,' 65 fee simple in all lands subject to tidal ebb and flow was in the state.
Rejecting petitioners' argument that, for purposes of the public trust, navi-
gability-in-fact was the determinative test for measuring the inland reach of
the state interest, the court declared that it could find no federal law address-
ing the applicability of the public trust to non-navigable, tidal water.' 66 The
court read the Genesee abandonment of the ebb-and-flow test as a logical
extension of the equal footing doctrine to states with no tidally influenced
water bodies. 67 It did not interpret that holding to indicate that ebb and
flow ought to be rejected for tidal waters. Indeed, the court found abundant
historical support for the proposition that, as for tidal waters, "navigability"
meant subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, not navigability-in-fact. 68
In an attempt to come to terms with the navigability concept, the court
adopted the "toothpick" standard for measuring the landward reach of the
public trust.1 69 For tidal and non-tidal waters alike,1 70 it stated that the
boundaries of the trust would not be the contours of the navigable chan-
nel 1 71 but rather the point where the high water mark struck land.172 While
non-navigable-in-fact waters might fall within those boundaries, as long as
one could float a toothpick and navigate from point to point upon it, the
land below those points was part of the trust corpus.17 ' By adopting this
standard, the court included within the public trust all lands below tidally-
influenced waters, regardless of the current or historical navigability-in-fact
163. Id. at 511.
164. Id. at 510-11.
165. Id. at 516.
166. Id. at 514.
167. Id. at 513-14.
168. Id. at 514-15; see also supra text accompanying notes 34-52.
169. Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 515.
170. Id. (referring to waters which are navigable-in-fact for trust purposes, i.e., excluding
fresh, non-navigable waters which are not subject to the public trust).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. The court articulated its "toothpick" metaphor:
[S]o long as by unbroken water course-when the level of the waters is at mean high
water mark--one may hoist a sail upon a toothpick and without interruption navi-
gate from the navigable channel/area to land, always afloat, the waters traversed and
the lands beneath them are within the inland boundaries ... granted [to] the State in
trust.
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of those waters. It held plainly that the lands over which the toothpick may
naturally sail' 74 are within the trust regardless of how far inland or remote
from the sea. 7 '
B. Public Versus Private Interests
Although significant property claims were at issue in Cinque Bambini, 1
76
the Mississippi court refused to allow ostensibly settled property expecta-
tions to defeat the state-maintained public interest. 177 While recognizing the
importance of stable property interests, the court correctly ruled that, in the
absence of specific legislative grants of land below tidal water, title to such
property would remain in the state. 17' The exercise of the trust pregnant in
that title mandates a continued obligation to preserve the public interest. By
acknowledging sovereign title and the right to issue mineral leases for the
property, the court properly deferred trust management to the state for an
arguably public objective.
179
IV. PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. V. Mississippi: THE SUPREME COURT
INVIGORATES THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
In upholding the judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court, the United
States Supreme Court determined that, as a matter of federal law, Missis-
sippi took title to all land lying under tidally-influenced water, regardless of
the water's navigability-in-fact. 80 In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,'
the Court took a modem look at the public trust doctrine, giving it a judicial
stamp as a dynamic state tool. But in so doing, the Court chose to cast its
analysis as little more than a "title suit.'
' 8 2
174. Id. at 515-16. The "natural" sail limitation is designed to exclude from the public
trust all waters which were brought within the tidal influence by unnatural means, such as
dredging. Id. at 519-20. In this case, the court excluded 98 acres from the public trust for
precisely this reason. Id.; see, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (exclud-
ing from the public trust and from the federal navigational servitude, a once private lagoon
now connected to the sea through artificial dredging); see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1
(1894); Stuart, Avulsion and Accretion: Emphasis Oregon, 3 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 345 (1965);
Waite, Public Rights to Use and Have Access to Navigable Waters, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 335.
175. Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 516-17.
176. Id. at 510.
177. Id. at 510-11.
178. Id. at 511.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 123-48.
180. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791, 793 (1988); see Cinque Bambini,
491 So. 2d at 512-13.
181. 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
182. Id. at 793. "Though great public interests and neither insignificant nor illegitimate
private interests are present and in conflict, this in the end is a title suit." Id. (quoting Cinque
Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 510). By choosing to frame the issue in terms of a title suit, the major-
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A. Majority Opinion
1. Equal Footing Doctrine Grants Title to States
The Court relied on its ruling in Shively v. Bowlby for the proposition that,
upon the Revolution, the rights reserved to the king in and to the tidal wa-
ters passed to the original states.' 83 Under the equal footing doctrine, those
rights charged with the public trust passed to the subsequently admitted
states.' 84 The Court looked to the law of the original states and found no
inconsistencies in the tidality limitation.' 85 Rejecting petitioners' claim that
the original states used navigability as the touchstone for the public trust, 86
the Court correctly accepted the state's argument that tidal influence was the
essence of the trust at common law and in the original states.'87 Although
there existed a good deal of confusion over the tidality and navigability stan-
dards for identification of public trust land, the Court has now, however
modestly,'88 sifted through the seeming inconsistencies.
The Court correctly pointed out that petitioners' contention that the Eng-
lish common law limiting the public trust to actual navigability was an argu-
able misreading of the law, but in any event it was no longer applicable to
the American evolution of the trust doctrine. 8 9 The Genesee decision per-
haps gave credence to the notion that navigability was the touchstone for
American law, but the Court pointed out that the Genesee line of cases
merely extended admiralty jurisdiction to inland waterways. None of the
cases relied on by the petitioner related to tidal, non-navigable waters like
those at issue in Phillips. 190 The Court announced that while Genesee ex-
tended the trust to navigable fresh waters, it did not simultaneously with-
draw from the trust the historically recognized tide waters.' 9 ' In identifying
the reach of such property, the Court clearly articulated that, for tidal water,
navigability-in-fact is irrelevant.
Upon admission to the Union, Mississippi acquired, at a minimum, the
right to control tidelands within its borders. The Court accepted that Mis-
ity appears to limit the application of its decision to the facts, perhaps yielding to a general
federalist fear of encroaching upon the property law of other states. The limitation appears to
be unnecessary because the decision grants no new affirmative state duties, but only clarifies
the geographical extent of the public trust for states that choose to go that far.
183. Id. at 794.
184. See supra notes 53-73 and accompanying text.
185. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 794; see supra notes 75-89.
186. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 794-95.
187. Id. at 795.
188. See supra note 182.
189. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 796.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 797. See generally Mann v. Tacoma Land Co., 153 U.S. 273 (1894).
(Vol. 38:571
Strengthening Sovereign Interest in Tidal Property
sissippi, once having acceded to those rights on an equal basis, could then
steer the course of its public trust according to its views of public policy.' 92
However, such modification was limited by the paramount public interest in
the trust corpus.19a The Court, consistent with its long line of trust deci-
sions beginning with Shively, recognized that the policy objectives of the
state are exclusively matters of state law. Phillips federalizes only the issue of
what lands were included within the states' respective trusts at the time of
statehood. It does not purport to disturb state law which recognizes a
stricter geographical limitation on trust property. 94 While conveyance of
trust property was not at issue in Phillips, nothing in the decision would
work to weaken the Illinois Central and Appleby standards for judicial re-
view of abandonment of trust property to private parties. Presumably,
although the Court chose to give great deference to state property law, there
remains a basis for Supreme Court review of violations of the public trust by
the state.
2. The Court Acknowledges a Broad Application
of Public Trust Purposes
The Court pointed to various uses of trust lands to illustrate that limiting
the trust definition to a navigability-in-fact standard would create an absurd
result.' 95 It reasoned that defining the trust in terms of navigation alone is
historically inaccurate.' 96 The Court alluded to extra-navigational interests
in fishing and shell-fishing but neglected to include the long line of recent
trust expansion cases which identified trust uses from recreation to environ-
mental protection. 197 Nonetheless, by recognizing such "diverse uses" of the
trust, 98 the Court declared that it would be logically inconsistent to limit its
definition by navigability. 9 9 The Court has consistently recognized that the
public uses which the states may choose to articulate are not the Court's to
define.2° °
192. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 799; see Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 294 (1967) (Stew-
art, J., concurring).
193. Phillips, 180 S. Ct. at 794; see Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926);
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). The Court seems to give a broad federalist
gloss to the issue of state control over public trust law while maintaining a federal capacity for
direct judicial review. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 794-95, 799.
194. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 798.
195. Id. at 795.
196. Id. at 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
197. See supra notes 123-48 and accompanying text.
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B. Dissent
The dissent, authored by Justice O'Connor, argued passionately that such
a determination disregarded precedent and would work incalculable injus-
tice to the settled property expectations of thousands of land owners in all
coastal states.20' Thus, as a matter of law, and on equitable grounds, the
dissent argued forcefully against the ebb-and-flow standard accepted by the
majority.
1. Navigability and the Widened Reach of the Public Trust: And the
Toothpick Sails On
The dissent countered that navigability was the historical test of the public
trust doctrine.20 2 It argued that the tidality standard adhered to by the ma-
jority spawned different tests for fresh and salt waters and, consequently,
was inappropriate.20 3 Although it acknowledged that the Genesee decision
merely extended admiralty jurisdiction to the inland waterways by virtue of
the navigability test, the dissent argued that the decision was more than just
an analogy to the supremacy of navigability for fresh waters. 2 ' The dissent
viewed the Genesee abandonment of tidality as the definitive statement on
the American departure from the tidal rule.2 °5 However, the case law and
legislative uses of the trust belie this line of thinking.2 °6
In addition, the dissent approached the application of the trust to discrete
and completely non-navigable water as a matter of first impression for the
Court, one which ought to be rejected as an illogical extension of the naviga-
bility language throughout trust jurisprudence. 207 The dissent further re-
fused to accept the suggestion that the public trust is an evolving doctrine
capable of expanding to address changing applications of the public interest.
Instead, it argued that the fundamental purpose of the trust is to preserve
navigable water as commercial highways. 20 ' For the dissent, to include non-
navigable streams and swamps, although physically connected to the sea,
would be an improper exercise of state control. Absent commercial naviga-
tion and notwithstanding the commercial interests of the state in lucrative
mineral leasing, there would appear to be no role for the public trust doc-
201. Id. at 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
202. Id.; see Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193 (1987); Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981); Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971).
203. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 802.
205. Id. at 801:-02.
206. See supra notes 123-48 and accompanying text.
207. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 801 (quoting Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667 (1891)); see supra notes 134-48
and accompanying text.
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trine. It would be necessary to read out of trust jurisprudence the expanding
public uses explicitly and tacitly approved of by the Court in order to reach
this conclusion.
20 9
Although the Supreme Court never discussed the propriety of the lower
court's illustrative toothpick metaphor, the Court did not rule inconsistently
with it. By affirming Mississippi's ruling that the state's public trust interest
extends to the innermost reaches of the tidal flow, the Court has implicitly
adopted this toothpick test. As a result, the Court has now greatly increased
the area subject to trust protection. As the dissent pointed out, nearly nine
million acres of land may fall within the reach of the public trust.21° The
true figure is probably much higher.21
2. Disruption of Reasonable Property Expectations?
The dissent in Phillips argued that reasonable property interests would be
destroyed by the tidality ruling, thereby depriving certain property owners of
a reasonable return on their investments,21 2 and subjecting them to uncer-
tainty which the principles of property law are purportedly designed to
prevent.213
The majority correctly countered that Mississippi law consistently held in
favor of the public's rights in lands subject to the tide.21 4 The reasonable-
ness and consistency of long-established federal and Mississippi precedent
mitigated any complaint of destruction of property expectations. 215  There
can be no reasonable property expectation in lands which, since Roman law,
have remained impressed with a public trust. Although the confusion
brought on by the introduction of the inland waterways may have, for a
time, vitiated the states' assertion of trust control, the mere suspicion of pri-
vate interest in lands below water is not a sufficient basis for developing rea-
sonable property expectations. As the Court pointed out, this confusion
over navigability never reached tidal property. 216 The only difficulties that
209. See, e.g., Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 371, 381-82 (1891) (recognizing reclamation
of trust land for urban expansion); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 75 (1855)(fishing
allowed).
210. See supra text accompanying note 24.
211. See, e.g., California v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr.
696 (1981) (four thousand miles of shorelands included within the trust); see Porro & Teleky,
Marshland Tidal Dilemma: A Tidal Phenomenon, 3 SETON HALL 323, 323 (1972) (244,000
acres of tidal marshland in New Jersey).
212. 108 S. Ct. at 804 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
213. Id.; see also Stevens, supra note 2; Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, supra
note 2.
214. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 794.
215. Id. at 798-99.
216. Id. at 796-97.
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arose were in connection with fresh water.217 As Phillips made clear, there
is no basis for property expectations in land below tidal water, regardless of
the extent of the tidal influence.
V. EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF STATE INTEREST: PROPOSED EXERCISES
OF THE PUBLIC DUTY
From the earliest extension of admiralty jurisdiction in Genesee, which
protected commercial navigation, through the evolving trust purposes sug-
gested by the state courts in cases such as Marks and National Audubon, and
the language which developed therefrom, state courts and legislatures were
not in a position to state categorically the extent to which they might assert
the state's public trust interest. Phillips unequivocally declared that states
such as Mississippi may assert fee simple in trust property.218
The Phillips ruling strengthens state control of tidelands for those states
wishing to extend the public trust to the extreme to which Mississippi was
prepared to go. It is important to note that this ruling creates no affirmative
duty on the states. It does, however, broaden the trust's operation both geo-
graphically and in terms of trust purposes.
From the public trust's commercial ground,2 9 emerging public needs
have extended the doctrine's traditional limitations. 220 From bathing to rec-
reation 22 1 to environmental protection 222 and now to revenue production,
the public trust has fulfilled its purpose as a non-intrusive vehicle for public
input into the disposition and use of important natural resources.
The state trust obligation need not operate as a restraint on alienation of
trust property as some commentators have suggested. 22' As far back as Illi-
nois Central, the Supreme Court had sanctioned the sale of trust lands.224
Although the level of judicial scrutiny will rise with the importance of the
conveyance, it is possible and prudent for states to grant fee simple or more
restrictive interests in certain trust property. Any such grant must be made
217. Id.; see Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876); The Propeller Genesee Chief v.
Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 456 (1851); see also supra notes 90-99 and accompanying
text.
218. The Court is silent on the necessity for a valid public objective in so claiming a fee
interest.
219. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11
(1894).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 130-34.
221. See State v. Village of Lake Delton, 93 Wis. 2d 78, 286 N.W.2d 622 (1979).
222. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text; Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491
P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
223. See Stevens, supra note 2; see also Rose, supra note 65.
224. See 146 U.S. 387 (1892); see also Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926).
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by the legislature for a valid public purpose.
22 5
When property is subject to the public trust, a state may restrict develop-
ment to promote public access, scenic preservation, and environmental con-
trol without falling prey to the increasingly restrictive takings limitations. If
the restrictions are reasonably related to the public interest inherent in the
public trust property itself, state development exactions may escape the re-
cently heightened standard of review for property regulation articulated in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission;226 the rationale being that no com-
plete property expectations may be anticipated for lands subject to the public
trust.
For coastal states rich with mineral deposits, the economic benefits associ-
ated with plenary state control over vast trust resources are obvious. Care
must be taken, though, not to impair the long-term public interest in such
property for short-term economic payoff.227
VI. CONCLUSION
The public trust doctrine, as originally articulated, protected the public
interest in fishing, navigation, and commerce. The sovereign, king or state,
became the guardian of these important public rights. Although transplant-
ing the doctrine to American soil necessitated changes in its narrow, histori-
cal framework, it has evolved to meet changing public perceptions of our
common natural resources. Where it once protected merely the traditional,
commercial, water-dependent uses, it may now reach non-water-dependent
commercial uses such as mineral leasing. It may now also provide a vehicle
for improving public access to tidelands and their preservation.
The Phillips decision will fortify the operation of the trust as a state tool
for economic and environmental control of significant resources, while par-
tially fulfilling Professor Sax's perception of the doctrine as a "tool for citi-
zens seeking a comprehensive legal approach to resource management
problems." 228 Although Phillips does not compel states to take action as
comprehensive as that of Mississippi, it will give strength to those state legis-
225. Appleby, 271 U.S. 364, 384.
226. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); see sources cited supra note 2.
227. See Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-60, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790,
796 (1971). "No single public interest in the use of navigable waters, though afforded the
protection of the public trust doctrine, is absolute. Some public uses must yield if other public
uses are to exist at all. The uses must be balanced and accommodated on a case by case basis."
State v. Village of Lake Delton, 93 Wis. 2d 78, 96, 286 N.W.2d 622, 632 (1979).
228. Sax, supra note 1, at 474.
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latures and activists who choose to assert the public interest more forcefully
in an age of ever-increasing property conflicts.
Stephen A. DeLeo
